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Cadena: Comparative Negligence and the Special Verdict.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND THE SPECIAL VERDICT
CARLOS C. CADENA*
There are two reasons why a study of the special verdict scheme is
desirable in connection with a discussion of the changes wrought by
the Texas Legislature in abolishing the ancient common law doctrine
of contributory negligence and substituting a doctrine of modified comparative negligence which permits the contributorily negligent plaintiff
to recover if his causative negligence does not exceed the combined
quantum of negligence of those against whom he seeks to recover.' In
the first place, the change in the substantive law necessarily requires
the submission of additional issues which will form the basis for the
comparison of the degree of causal negligence of the parties involved.
Obviously, without findings relating to the percentage of negligence of
the parties, there is no basis for -the application of the doctrine. Thus,
even without a change in the rules governing the submission of special
issues, the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine requires
consideration of the manner of submitting those special issues designed
to establish the facts necessary to enable the court to apply the doctrine. Secondly, the Supreme Court of Texas, on May 25, 1973, exercised its rule-making power to amend Rules 271, 272 and 277 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, effective September 1, 1973. These
changes obviously were intended to simplify the manner of submitting
special issues in negligence cases. 2 As a result of these amendments
by the supreme court, we cannot limit our inquiry to the manner of
submitting just those issues required for a comparison of the degrees
of causative negligence of the parties. We must also consider the form
of the issues relating to primary and contributory negligence.' Thus,
* Associate Justice of the Fourth Court of Civil Appeals of Texas; J.D., University of Texas.
1. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Supp. 1974).
2. The legislation for the reform of tort law recommended by the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas included a proposal for the simplification of special
issues. This portion of the recommended legislation was deleted because of the adoption by the Texas Supreme Court, on May 25, 1973, of amendments to the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure, including the amendment of the rules relating to special issue submission.
3. Although the comparative negligence statute does not speak in terms of proximate cause, it is assumed that our courts, in determining whether and to what extent
the amount of damages will be diminished because of plaintiff's negligence, will con-
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we are intially concerned with the effect of the amendment to Rule
277.
THE CHANGES IN RULE

277

Rule 277, as most recently amended by the supreme court, reads
as follows:
In all jury cases the court may submit said cause upon special
issues. . . controlling the disposition of the case that are raised by
the written pleadings and the evidence in the case ....
It shall be discretionary with the court whether to submit separate questions with respect to each element of a case or to submit
such issues broadly. It shall not be objectionable that a question
is general or includes a combination of elements of issues. Inferential rebuttal issues shall not be submitted. The placing of the
burden of proof may be accomplished by instructions rather than
by inclusion in the question.
The court may submit special issues in a negligence case in a
manner that allows a listing of the claimed acts or omissions of any
party to an accident, event or occurrence that are raised by the
pleadings and the evidence with appropriate spaces for answers as
to each act or omission which is listed. The court may submit a
single question, which may be conditioned upon an answer that an
act or omission occurred, inquiring whether a party was negligent,
with a listing of the several acts or omissions corresponding to
those listed in the preceding questions and with appropriate spaces
for each answer. Conditioned upon an affirmative finding of negligence as to one or more acts or omissions, a further question may
inquire whether the corresponding specific acts or omissions (listing them) inquired about in the preceding questions were proximate causes of the accident, event, or occurrence that is the basis
of the suit. Similar forms of questions may be used in other cases.
In any case in which issues are raised concerning the negligence
of more than one party, the court shall submit an issue inquiring
what percentage, if any, of the negligence that caused the occurrence in question is attributable to each of the parties found to
have been negligent, and shall instruct the jury to answer the damage issues without any reduction because of negligence, if any, of
the party injured.
The court may submit an issue disjunctively where it is apparent
from the evidence that one or the other of the conditions or facts
inquired about necessarily exists. ...
tinue to require a showing that his negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence
in question.
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The court shall not in its charge comment directly on the weight
of the evidence or advise the jury of the effect of their answers, but
the court's charge shall not be objectionable on the ground that it
incidentally constitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence or
advises the jury of the effect of their answers where it is properly
a part of an explanatory instruction or definition.
Prior to the 1973 amendment, Rule 277 required the submission of
the special issues "raised by the written pleadings and the evidence in
the case." 4 The 1973 amendment requires the submission of the special issues "controlling the disposition of the case that are raised by
The difference
the written pleadings and the evidence in the case."'
in the language is obvious, but it is doubtful whether the addition of
the words "controlling the disposition of the case" is significant. Even
under the old rule, it was well settled that only those "controlling issues"
tending to establish a theory of recovery or defense and those raised by
the pleadings and the evidence were required to be submittedA Unfortunately, the decisions furnish little guidance in determining what is
'7
a "controlling issue."
The 1973 amendment does make it clear, however, that the term
"controlling issues" no longer has one meaning in negligence cases and
a different meaning in cases where the cause of action is not based
on negligence. Where plaintiff's claim was not based on negligence,
our courts generally upheld the submission of broad, general, global
or multifarious issues." In negligence cases, on the other hand, because
of Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.,9 our courts, with some exceptions, condemned the submission of such broad issues and required that each
act, omission or condition, which was alleged to constitute negligence,
be submitted separately.10 Since the requirement of Rule 279 that
"controllling issues" be submitted makes no distinction between negligence and non-negligence cases, the dichotomy in the Texas decisions
4. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (1967).
5. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277 (emphasis added).
6. TEx. R. Civ. P. 279; Northeast Texas Motor Lines, Inc. v. Hodges, 138 Tex.
280, 284, 158 S.W.2d 487, 489 (1942); Villanueva v. Rodriguez, 300 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
7. Attempts to define "controlling issues" have bogged down in abstractions which
largely beg the question and do not solve the problem in close cases. 3 R. McDoNALD,
TExAs CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.06.1, at 284-85 (1970).

8. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 399, 224 S.W.2d 871, 876
(1949). See also 3 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRAC'rICE § 12.06.2. at 286-87 (1970).
9. 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1920).
10. See 3 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.06.2, at 287-89 (1970). See
also G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 35 (1959).
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appears to rest on no defensible foundation."

Furthermore, our

courts have made no effort to justify the distinction but have rested
their continued acceptance of it solely on a reluctance to overturn prior

decisions. 12
The 1973 amendment clearly deprives the decisions requiring a pro-

liferation of issues in negligence cases of all precedental value.

The

amendment deletes the requirement that each issue "be submitted distinctly and separately" and instead, expressly vests the trial court with

discretion to submit the issues "broadly."

The intention of the new

language is made clear by providing "it shall not be objectionable that

a question is general or includes a combination of elements or issues."
Under the amended rule, then, an issue simply inquiring whether a party
was negligent, without specifically inquiring as to whether he was guilty
13
of a specific act or omission, is proper.

SUBMITTING THE NEGLIGENCE

IsSUEs

Irrespective of the number of specific acts or omissions relied on as
constituting negligence, the court may simply submit a single issue inquiring whether the jury finds from a preponderance of the evidence
that a party was negligent. Thus, the court may now choose to inquire
into the negligence of the parties generally, rather than with reference
to specific acts or omissions.
This general method of submission would clearly decrease the number of cases in which the jury "hangs." Five jurors might be convinced that the party was negligent as to speed, but was not driving
with faulty brakes, while five other jurors might be convinced that the
11. See Note, 34 TEXAs L. REv. 138 (1955).
12. As the court in Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262
S.W.2d 99 (1953) stated:
It may appear somewhat metaphysical to say, on the one hand, that allegations
of specific facts or defects resulting in a "fire hazard" [City of Houston v. Lurie,
148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871 (1949)] or "cruel treatment" [Howell v. Howell,
147 Tex. 14, 210 S.W.2d 978 (1948)] are no obstacle to submitting the general
issue of "fire hazard" or "cruel treatment" as one jury issue and, on the other
hand, that similar allegations as to conduct resulting in negligence require each
such allegation to be made the subject of a separate issue. . . . It is noteworthy
that the late decisions which seem to reverse the older practice are not negligence
cases. In the latter we understand the almost universal practice at the bar of this
state to be that of specific issues. To change it drastically by judicial decision
would in our judgment cause undue confusion.
Id. at 627-28, 262 S.W.2d at 103-04.
13. In addition to simplifying special issues there is a new provision concerning
the placing of the burden of proof. There is no apparent basis for holding that the
mere rewriting of the provision has brought about any change- as the provision appears
to do no more than simplify the old Rule.
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party was driving with defective brakes, but was not speeding. If all
10 jurors are required to be in agreement as to speed or defective
brakes, obviously, in the assumed situation there would be disagreement, resulting in a hung jury.14 But if the grounds of negligence are
not specified, all 10 jurors would be in agreement that the party was
negligent.
This type of verdict has some appeal for trial judges, since it avoids
the refinements of specific submission and is, therefore, less likely to
be reversed.

However, in view of the long established practice in

the submission of negligence cases in Texas, there is reason to doubt
that the Texas trial courts will abandon the tradition of asking the jury
to make findings as to specific acts or omissions. 15 If the trial court

opts to utilize the more specific form of verdict, it may simply submit
the case in the manner in which negligence cases have been submitted

in the past. The court will inquire by means of separate issues as to
the existence of each act or omission and inquire, again in separate
issues, as to the negligent character of each found act or omission.
Under the new Rule 277, a "listing" form of issue is expressly permitted. If the court decides upon this method of submission, it would

seek to elicit an answer concerning each claimed act of negligence by
first submitting a single question listing the alleged acts or omissions
of the party whose conduct is the subject of the issue, with appropriate
spaces for answers as to each act or omission listed. The second issue,

conditioned upon an answer in the first question that "an act or omission occurred," would inquire whether that party was negligent.

This

would include a listing of the several acts or omissions corresponding
14. TEx. R. Civ. P. 292 was amended, effective February 1, 1973, to permit rendition of a verdict by the concurrence, as to each and all answers made, of the same
10 members of an original jury of 12 or of the same five members of an original
jury of six.
15. The fact that the general form of the Texas comparative negligence statute
was borrowed from the State of Wisconsin does not, of course, require that Texas follow the Wisconsin practice relating to submission of special issues. Yet it is interesting
to note that, although the Wisconsin statute regulating the submission of special issues
(Wis. STAT. ANN. § 270.27 (Supp. 1973)) also allows trial judges to determine the
form of submission of special issues, the Wisconsin courts prefer to submit questions
inquiring about specific acts of negligence. HEFr & HEF, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
MANUAL § 8.30 (1971).
In Wisconsin, what is referred to as the "fault" type of special verdict has been
recognized as possible in the absence of objection. In a comparative negligence case,
this type of verdict combines negligence, causation and apportionment in a single issue
by merely inquiring, "(I]n what percentage, if any, do you find the defendant at fault?"
But this abbreviated form of verdict will not be used if there is objection. Fink v.
Reitz, 137 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Wis. 1965).
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to those listed in the first issue and with appropriate spaces for answers
as to each listed act or omission.
It would also appear that it would now be proper to elicit a finding
of negligence as to each of several alleged acts or omissions by the use
of but a single issue. Thus, in a collision case, admittedly oversimplified, plaintiff might claim that defendant was negligent in driving with
defective brakes and in failing to turn to the left in order to avoid the
collision. The single issue as to defendant's negligence might take
6
the following form:'
At the time and place in question, was the defendant negligent
in any of the following respects:
(a) As to driving with defective brakes, if you have found that
he was driving with defective brakes?
Answer:
(b) As to his failure to turn to the left in order to avoid the collision, if you have found that he did fail to turn to the left?
Answer:
This form of inquiry as to the negligent character of each alleged act
or omission is based on the provision in amended Rule 277 that it
"shall not be objectionable that a question is general or includes a combination of elements or issues." The suggested issue is certainly no
broader and contains no greater combination of elements or issues than
does the single issue which merely inquires whether defendant was negligent, without reference to any specific act or omission. The qualifying words "if you have found" have been included in order to avoid
the objection that the issue contains a comment on the weight of the
evidence by assuming that defendant was driving with defective brakes
or that he failed to turn to the left. The same rules, of course, would
be applicable to the submission of issues inquiring into the negligence
of all other parties to the suit. Along with removal of narrow special
issues was the deletion of the requirement that the issues be submitted
"in plain and simple language." It is hoped that this deletion will
not be interpreted by trial judges as requiring that the issues be submitted in obscure and complicated language.
16. The traditional method of submission, believed by Texas judges and lawyers
to be of value in properly placing the burden of proof as to each issue, is to begin
each issue with "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence .

. . ."

This

introductory clause has been omitted for the sake of brevity in the suggested issue and in
all subsequent suggested issues. The necessity for the use of the clause is eliminated
under amended Rule 277.

Its elimination by use of a separate instruction relating to

burden of proof was also possible under the old Rule but seldom, if ever, done.
G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TExAs § 31 (1959).
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PROXIMATE CAUSE

If the trial judge decides to frame the charge by resorting to the
familiar cluster of three issues as to each claimed act or omission, he
may do so under the new rule, in which case the framing of the proximate cause issue in each cluster will present no problem. If he has
chosen to resort to the listing procedure, he will submit a single proximate cause issue. This will be conditioned upon an affirmative finding
of negligence as to one or more acts or omissions and will inquire
whether the corresponding acts or omissions listed were proximate
causes of the occurrence in question. In such a case, the proximate
cause issue, again oversimplified, might take the following form (assume that Question 2 is the negligence issue):
If you answered "yes" to any subdivision of Question 2, then
answer the corresponding subdivisions of this question:
Was such negligence on the part of the defendant a proximate
cause of the occurrence in question:
(a) As to the driving with defective brakes?
Answer:
(b) As to failure to turn left?

Answer:

One can only contemplate in awe the possibility that some iconoclastic trial judge will dare to submit an issue which includes a combination
of three elements or issues, simply inquiring whether the party whose
conduct is in question "was guilty of negligence which was a proximate
cause of the occurrence in question." There is, of course, an easily
recognizable distinction between awestruck contemplation and expectation.
INFERENTIAL REBUTTAL ISSUES

Over the years, numerous decisions established the requirement that
a particular type of issue, generally identified as an inferential rebuttal
issue, be submitted if raised by the pleadings and the evidence. Stated
differently, the court was obligated to inquire concerning the existence
of facts which would establish the non-existence of some factual element of plaintiff's cause of action or of defendant's contentions in the
nature of confession and avoidance. Such issues were, in effect, argumentative denials; however, a favorable answer to an inferential rebuttal
issue could not, standing alone, support a judgment. It could only produce an irreconcilable conflict with the answer to the issue which it
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was designed to inferentially rebut. 17
The new Rule 277, however, specifically proscribes the submission
of inferential rebuttal issues. This blanket prohibition of the submission of such issues is not as revolutionary as it appears to be. Prior
to the 1973 amendment of Rule 277, the Texas Supreme Court had
already begun to cast such issues into exterior darkness by holding that
if such issues are raised by the pleadings and the evidence, explanatory
instructions which fairly present the theory to the jury will be used instead.1s
COMMENTS ON THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE

Prior to September 1, 1973, Rule 272 required the trial judge to
"so frame his charge as to . . . not therein comment on the weight
of the evidence .. .."19 This provision was deleted by the 1973
amendment to Rule 272, and the proposition is now found in the new
Rule 277. However, the new Rule provides that the court shall not
in its charge "comment directly on the weight of the evidence."2 0 Additionally, Rule 277 further requires that the court's charge "shall not
be objectionable on the ground that it incidentally constitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence . . . where it is properly a part
of an explanatory instruction or definition."'" The change clearly allows indirect comments on the weight of the evidence, and incidental
comments are made unobjectionable so long as they are "properly" a
part of an explanatory instruction or definition. The same rules apply
to complaints that the court in its charge has advised the jury of the
effect of their answers. If the portion of the charge challenged "indirectly" advises the jury of the effect of their answers or if it is "properly" a part of an explanatory instruction or definition, the complaint
will fall on a deaf judicial ear.
17. See G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 31 (1959).

For a crit-

icism of the practice of submitting inferential rebuttal issues, see Smith v. Red Arrow
Freight Lines, Inc., 460 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).

See also Note, 9 Hous. L. REV. 168 (1971).

18. In 1971, the supreme court substituted explanatory instruction for the sudden
emergency and unavoidable accident issues. Yarbrough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188,
191 (Tex. Sup. 1971). In addition see Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452
(Tex. Sup. 1972) (eliminating issues relating to "no-duty," open and obvious and discovered peril); Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Serv., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex.
Sup. 1967) (eliminating issues which included, excluded or mitigated damages); Dallas
Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359, 368, 250 S.W.2d 379, 383-84 (1952)
(eliminating the new and independent cause issue).

19. TEx. R. Civ. P. 272 (1967).
20. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277 (emphasis added).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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Where a case is submitted on special issues, the error of commenting
on the weight of the evidence most often appears in a definition or
explanatory instruction, or in a special issue wherein the judge inadvertently assumes the existence of a material, controverted fact. 22 Frequently, a ground of recovery or defense depends on proof of the existence of several factual elements which, while related, were required,
under the old practice, to be submitted separately. When inquiring
about one of the factual elements, it was sometimes necessary to mention one of the others for often two related factual issues were controverted and one had to be mentioned in inquiring about the other. In
such instances, the error of commenting upon the weight of the evidence
by assuming the existence of a controverted fact, could be avoided by
use of "if any" or some phrase of equivalent import, or by conditional
submission of issues. This, of course, has been the established practice.
Perhaps the portion of the new Rule which permits incidental comments on the weight of the evidence, or incidentally advising the jury
of the effect of their answers, will have the effect of bringing about
a change when it is considered in connection with the new provision
in Rule 277. This provision requires the court to submit such explanatory instructions and definitions "as shall be proper to enable the jury
to return a verdict. ' 23 Prior to the 1973 amendment, Rule 277 required only the submission of such explanatory instructions and definitions as were necessary to enable the jury to pass on and render a verdict on the issues submitted.2 4 Since an explanation or definition may
be proper, even if it is not necessary, the new rule may reduce the num2
ber of reversals. 5
DAMAGES

The amendment to Rule 277 creates no problems in connection with
the submission of the damage issue. The trial court may, as has been
the general practice, submit a single issue inquiring as to the amount
of damages suffered by plaintiff, accompanied by an instruction limiting
22. See 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.03.2 (1970).
23. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (emphasis added).
24. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (1967).
25. See Boaz v. White Auto Stores, 141 Tex. 366, 142 S.W.2d 481 (1943); Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Sup. 1969). During
his presentation of a paper (apparently not yet published) at the annual conference
of the Judicial Section of the State Bar of Texas in Amarillo, Texas, on September
28, 1973, the Honorable Jack Pope, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas,
described the Ponder opinion as one "which you will need to study, not just read."
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the jurors to consideration of the elements included in the applicable
measure of damages. The trial court may decide, however, as some
trial judges did before the amendment of Rule 277, in favor of a separate submission of each element of damages-either by submission of
a single issue listing the various elements, with appropriate spaces for
answers as to each element, or by submitting separate issues as to each
element. The separate submission of each element is preferable, since
such a practice would enable rendition of judgment on the verdict even
if the trial or appellate court determined that an improper element of
damages was submitted, or that one or more of the items submitted
is without support in the evidence. 6
It must be borne in mind that in any case involving the application
of the comparative negligence doctrine, it is the duty of the jury to
determine the full amount of all damages sustained by the injured parties. That is, the jury does not determine the amount which any injured
party will receive. For this reason, the amendment to Rule 277 requires that in any case where there are issues raised concerning the
negligence of more than one party "the court shall instruct the jury
to answer the damage issues without any reduction because of negligence, if any, of the party injured."
APPORTIONMENT ISSUES

In any case involving the negligence of more than one party, Rule
277 now requires the submission of "an issue " inquiring what percentage, if any, of the negligence that caused the occurrence in question
is attributable to each of the parties found to have been negligent. Although the requirement that the court, in such cases, shall submit an
issue of this nature makes it clear that the submission of but a single
apportionment issue is contemplated, there would appear to be no valid
objection to the submission of a separate issue as to each party who
has been found negligent. However, since the percentages found by
the jury must total 100 percent, the submission in a single issue appears
preferable because this would facilitate addition. It would also seem
desirable to accompany the issue with an explanatory instruction pointing out to the jury that the total of the percentages of fault which they
attribute to each party must amount to 100 percent.
The special issue set out below would be applicable to a case where
26. See El Paso City Lines, Inc. v. Benjamin, 451 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. Civ.
App.-E1 Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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a single plaintiff, P, is seeking recovery from three defendants, 1, 2
and 3. The term "Question 1" refers to the issue or issues relating to
the causal negligence of defendant 1. The terms "Question 2" and
"Question 3" relate to the issue or issues concerning the causal negligence of defendants 2 and 3, respectively, and the term "Question 4"
refers to the issue or issues inquiring into the causal negligence of P.
With these assumptions in mind, the following form of special issue is
suggested:
If you have answered "yes" to one or more of Questions 1, 2, 3
and 4, then answer the following question:
Taking the combined negligence which proximately caused the
occurrence in question as aggregating 100 percent, what percentage of such negligence do you attribute to:
(a) Defendant 1 (you will answer this subdivision of this question only if you answered "yes" to Question 1)
Answer:
%
(b) Defendant 2 (you will answer this subdivision only if you
answered "yes" to Question 2)
Answer:
%
(c) Defendant 3 (you will answer this subdivision only if you
answered "yes" to Question 3)
Answer:
%
(d) Plaintiff P (you will answer this subdivision only if you
answered "yes" to Question 4)
%
Answer:
The total of your answers to subdivisions (a), (b), (c) and (d)
of this question must be 100 percent.
Assume that, in answer to the damages issue, the jury found that
plaintiff's total damages were $10,000 and that the answers to the apportionment issue establish that plaintiff was 20 percent at fault, defendant 1 was 10 percent at fault, defendant 2 was 40 percent at fault,
and defendant 3 was 30 percent at fault. Since plaintiff's damages
total $10,000, he will be entitled to recover $8,000 because, under section 1 of the comparative negligence statute, the amount of damages
found by the jury must "be diminished in proportion to the amount
of negligence atributable to the person injured. 27
If plaintiff's negligence does not exceed the total negligence of all
defendants and if the negligence of each defendant is greater than that
of plaintiff, each defendant is jointly and severally liable to plaintiff,
under section 2(c), for the entire $8,000. In such a situation section
27. Thx. REv.

Civ. STAT.

ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Supp. 1974).
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2(b) provides that contribution to the damages awarded to plaintiff
shall be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to
each defendant. In our example, however, one of the defendants was
found to be less at fault than the plaintiff. The plaintiff would still
be entitled to recover the sum of $8,000, even though his percentage
of fault is greater than defendant l's, since plaintiff's fault does not
exceed the total negligence of all the defendants. But since section
2(c) of the statute provides that where plaintiff is at fault to a greater
degree than a particular defendant against whom he is entitled to recover, such defendant is liable to plaintiff only for an amount which
represents the percentage of negligence attributable to such defendant.
P, in the event of defendants' 2 and 3 insolvency, would be able to
collect only $800 from defendant 1. In the event that defendant 1
is insolvent, plaintiff would be entitled to recover the entire $8,000
from defendants 2 and 3, since the judgment against defendants 1,
2 and 3 is a joint and several one and defendants 2 and 3 find no
protection in section 2(c) because their negligence is not less than
28
plaintiffs.
CROSS-ACTIONS

In dealing with cross-actions in a comparative negligence situation,
the set-off provisions of section 2(f) of the statute come into play. Under this provision, if the verdict results in two claimants being liable
to each other, the claimant who is liable for the greater amount is entitled to a credit toward his liability in the amount of damages owed
him by the other claimant.
We will assume the simple case involving but one plaintiff and one
defendant, where both parties seek to recover damages flowing from
the alleged negligent conduct of the other. The special issues should
present no great problem. Issues would be submitted relating to the
causal negligence of each party, and separate inquiry would be made
into the total loss suffered by each party. These would then be followed by the apportionment issue.
If the jury found that plaintiff suffered loss in the amount of $10,000, that defendant's losses amounted to $5,000, and that each party
was 50 percent at fault, plaintiff would be entitled to recover $5,000
from defendant, while defendant would be entitled to recover $2,500
28. This and following specific examples used to illustrate the manner in which
the jury's answers are translated into a judgment are taken from Fisher, Nugent &
Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, found at page 655 of
this Journal.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss4/3
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The net result would be that plaintiff would recover

$2,500.
CONCLUSION

Admittedly, the factual situations assumed in connection with the
suggested forms of special issues dealing with a comparative negligence
case have been deliberately kept rather simple. Further, it is not anticipated that the suggested issues will actually be submitted in the language in which they have been couched in this discussion. Judges and
attorneys, no doubt, will frame the issues in language which is less inartistic and better calculated to focus the attention of the jury more
precisely on the factual issue which is the subject of inquiry. It is only
hoped that in doing so our trial judges and lawyers will bear in mind
the purposes of these amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure
which were to provide for a less complicated form of special verdict
and to provide our trial judges with an opportunity to reduce the number of issues which a jury must answer in order to give the court a
factual basis for rendering judgment.
Irrespective of whether the general forms of issues suggested here
find favor with the bench and bar, it is hoped that the amendments
to the Rules will achieve the desired results of significantly decreasing
the complaints with which we are all painfully familiar and eliminating
a form of submission which, in the opinion of many, frustrates the intelligent and effective use of the jury. The Texas Supreme Court has
heeded the outcry and has given us the tools necessary to make the
required improvements. The result will depend on whether, and how,
we decide to use such tools.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

13

